The start of the new year offers a chance to look forward raising some justified questions about the goal set in 2011 - the toppling of the Assad regime including all its cronies responsible for crimes against humanity.
Last year the resistance forces were generally urged to act in defensive: countless random assaults on civilians, their homes, their properties as well as their bare lives. The regime forces' tactics were clear: noone is nowhere safe, not even at funerals when normally honorable respect should be granted. It's time to get into the offensive. One part is the realization of the forthcoming victory in the minds including all its consequences - like successful sportsmen saying: the match will be won first in the head.
To overcome this disgraceful regime it takes serious considerations about the whole structure built up in nearly five decades to maintain the power:
1) The clan. The main demand of the people is for sure the downfall of Bashar al-Assad. But the whole family represents the unwanted dynastic rulership. Only to get rid of Bashar and necessarily of his younger brother Maher who commands the Syrian army generally and the most dreaded division especially is not all. The whole clan has to banned for lifetime from all political functions, in case of need by law. Of course there may be risks like attempts to undermine the new constitutional state by spreading unrest from the self-chosen exile as we can witness in these days in Libya where Aisha and Saadi Ghaddafi are trying to discredit the interim government and to sabotage their efforts creating a sovereign state. The more important it will become in the post-Assad future to keep the possible influence of the clan on all levels as low as possible.
2) The party. Baathism offers by a closer look many similarities to the Third Reich National Socialism. One apparent common aspect is the clear definition of an enemy who has to be eliminated. The slightest sign of doubts or concerns makes even the loyal supporter an enemy who has to be silenced, in the best case forever. Such indoctrinated loyalty opens over the years the field for a class of selfish sociopaths and supremacists controlling the whole apparatus in favor to the ruling elites. Those who still have a conscience but are dependent to the exising system by getting emotionally blackmailed tend to fatal silence. The program of denazification after the defeat of the Third Reich may be a useful indication for the long-term rehabilitation of the Syrian society. A debaathification which helps to figure out those being responsible for decisions and to judge them in an objective trial.
3) The army. A crucial question in each liberation fight is: should the official army be dispersed after the downfall of the regime or get maintained in its' structure? Restructuring it would be the better way if all responsible regime loyals can clearly be identified and replaced. Maintaining the army as such may calm also those in the civil society sceptical on too radical changes in their environment and therefore prone to counter-revolutionary restaurative movements. On the other side strenghens the shameful example of the SCAF in Egypt the concerns over the exisiting army structure whose true intentions are differing from the people's origin demands leading to a new conflict. The Free Syrian Army which is holding a key position in the organized resistance is already adapting the basic disciplinary military structure and doesn't need to be cleaned from pro-regime elements after the victory over the regime.
4) The informants. While the structures of the Mukhabarat and the shabeeha could be reconstructed with the help of fact-finding committees the network of regime informants among the civil society isn't as easy to uncover. The Baath cult has created generations of mistrust and the freed Syrians will have to learn how they handle this circumstance. A closer look to some of the former communist East European states and their way to deal with it might be helpful. Avoiding eruptive revenge acts is as even necessary as appealing for insight and remorse. This will isolate the irreformable hardliners amongst the informers and make it more easy for those who honestly regret their deeds to return in the society. Even if it will be not forgotten it can be forgiven as a sign of forbearance - something the defeated regime was never able to.
The Syrians themselves are demanded to decide over their future in a post-Assad Syria. The earlier they'll realize the needed requirements to install a functioning pluralistic democracy the less frail the common political system will become.
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