It is in the nature or every idea or intention to be confronted sooner or later with doubts or concerns, from those who invented it to prove its feasibility or from those who are generally worrying or having serious interests to prevent its realization.
Even the idea of freedom is exposed to it, mainly the lobby of the last ones mentioned above trying to do everything to maintain the status quo: rulers who fear to lose their power, serving commanders of security forces facing warrants after a regime's toppled, loyal elites who are afraid to lose their privileges, other restrictive governments who are worried about the glooming spark of change which may reach their own people and the silent ones who believe a regime change may bear more risks than advantages.
The fast end of Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia has strengthened the revolutionary movements in the whole region. The fall of Egypt's unregenerate Mubarak showed that we haven't witnessed only a one hit wonder. The stressful liberation of Libya marked again the inevitability of a tyrant's fate, his decline. But in the meantime other dictators have precisely noticed the events around them and began to counterattack with a very dirty but efficient weapon: buying time.
Ali Saleh is presenting himself unfortunately as the master of this tactic. At the expense of the resilient but nevertheless suffering Yemenis he runs a disgraceful zigzag course through the minefield of international diplomacy. Countless times he offered to sign contracts which granted a transitional period or even his personal immunity revoking his announcements the next day or finding other reasons not to follow the mediated road map.
Assad is doing the same in Syria with the difference that his attempts to crackdown the uprising against him are much more bloodier. The Syrian state his father built up is one of the most complex restrictive systems: numerous secret services and intelligence units are observing each and everyone, not even high ranking regime loyals are excepted from their surveillance. In this climate of fear and mistrust the dynastic rulers felt being safe from any form of social succussion.
Until this year.
The Syrians saw their chance to tear down their own iron curtain and to present the world outside what really happens in their country. Encouraged through the Arab Spring they decided to put the regime to an end. The price of their courageous movement is indeed very high up to now. Assads army and security forces are killing daily several dozens civilians including children appearing more randomly than planned but nevertheless systematically. The list of crimes against humanity is in the meantime too long to list it up here.
But it's not only an unequal confrontation between chanting protesters and heavy armed security forces in the streets of the Syrian cities, it's also a 'war of words' fought out between the revolutionaries and their growing number of supporters on the one side and the regime with their loyals, lobbyists and spokesmen on the other. Assad is still playing the cards of sectarianism, armed gangs and civil war phobias. Each one can be disproved, the sectarianism thesis for example through the images of Muslims and Christians praying together or the pictures of Alawis joining the resistance movements hand in hand with Sunnis. The armed gangs myth for example with the hilarious videos of Homsees throwing egg plants in a hand grenade style to demonstrate that their only weapons are vegetables. And the civil war concerns are spread from the regime to give itself the legitimization of their chosen crackdown measures mainly addressed to those who are dealing with their own fears about the future.
More difficult is it to object against theories about the time after Assad. Dealing only with scenarios it takes more than putting some facts on the table. Imagination is required and also a tool called comparison - even if some may now argue that certain situations aren't compatible at all, just in the case of Syria such a comparison may be useful to illustrate the complexity of the initial position.
The Syrian apparatus is more than the family Assad itself. The fall of the tyrant does not imply a complete change in all its' levels. The question is: what are the responsibles of the numerous secret services doing after the regime change? Contrary to the army the different Mukhabarat branches are following their own orders. In the best case they may be disband. But that won't happen from one day to the other. A difficult challenge for both the transitional and the elected new government. As assistance they possibly may rely upon the experiences Germany has made after the reunification with the former GDR secret service Staatssicherheit (Stasi). As central intelligence unit the Stasi collected all kind of informations about the GDR citizens having even the authority to arrest and charge regime opponents. The uncovering of the Stasi dossiers is more than twenty years after the decline of the GDR not fully completed. A similar, maybe more troublesome way the Syrians will have to go due to the fact that the Mukhabarat is a conglomerate of more than a dozen secret services.
The next question deals with the shabiha. In the moment the regime is toppled all their activities aren't backed up any longer and they become criminals. Some may surrender, some may try to hide themselves hoping that they will never be discovered, some may flee and some may resist becoming themselves underground fighters. Same applies to all the foreign mercenaries Hezbollah or the Iranian regime has sent to support Assad's crackdown measures. A lot of work for the common Syrian government but necessary to reinstall the public order in the streets and on the places. The people want to leave their homes going to school, work or shopping without risking their lives. The sooner this is guaranteed the more trust the civilians have in their new political system. Especially those fearing incertainty will be convinced from the right decision to bring down the old regime.
Finally a look at the elites. Profiting from the actual status quo they're swaying themselves in safety as long as the regime stays in power. But this safety is deceitful. Tyranny often grants the conservative ones special privileges. But when it comes to a showdown the tyrants will demand sacrifices even from those who felt longtime protected. Elites are mainly materialistic orientated. In the moment they are urged to decide between their properties and the idealist intention of their protectors even to perish with them the vast majority will search an exit - be it the arrangement with the new political class. Of course will those face justice who actively financed certain regime activities to suppress the population but many aren't in direct coherence to the executive forces. They pursue their own businesses only paying with their silent support for the rulership system.
Nobody can really predict how the distant future of a Syria without the Assad regime will look en detail. But through relieving concerns and fears the inevitable change comes more closer and the forthcoming tasks more visible.
No comments:
Post a Comment